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Abstract
Advances in information-processing technology have signiﬁcantly eroded the advan-
tages of small scale and proximity to customers that traditionally enabled community
banks and other small-scale lenders to thrive. Nonetheless, U.S. credit unions have ex-
perienced increasing membership and market share, though consolidation has reduced
the number of credit unions and increased their average size. We investigate the evo-
lution of the eﬃciency and productivity of U.S. credit unions between 1989 and 2006
using a new methodology that benchmarks the performance of individual ﬁrms against
an estimated order-α quantile lying “near” the eﬃcient frontier. We construct a cost
analog of the widely-used Malmquist productivity index, and decompose the index to
estimate changes in cost and scale eﬃciency, and changes in technology, that explain
changes in cost-productivity. We ﬁnd that cost-productivity fell on average across all
credit unions but especially among smaller credit unions. Smaller credit unions con-
fronted an unfavorable shift in technology that increased the minimum cost required to
produce given amounts of output. In addition, all but the largest credit unions became
less scale eﬃcient over time.
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Technological advances and changes in regulation have profoundly altered the landscape of
banking in the United States and elsewhere. For example, the relaxation of restrictions on
branching, both within and across state borders, precipitated a consolidated wave that has
halved the number commercial banks in the United States since the mid-1980s. Over the
same years, advances in information processing technologies lowered the cost of obtaining
quantitative and other “hard” information about potential borrowers, and thereby reduced
the advantages of small scale, close proximity and local ties that gave small, “community”
banks a competitive advantage in lending to small businesses and other “informationally-
opaque” borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Berger, 2003; Bernanke, 2006). Besides
promoting consolidation among banks, regulatory and technological changes have spurred
growth in the size of banks (Berger et al., 1999). Large banks have tended to be more
proﬁtable than small banks in recent years, and exhibit larger increases in productivity and
eﬃciency (Wheelock and Wilson, 2009).
Credit unions, like community banks, traditionally have served small retail customers.
Credit unions are mutual organizations that provide deposit, lending, and other services to a
membership deﬁned by an occupational, fraternal, or other common bond. A common bond
is advantageous because it can reduce the cost of assessing the credit-worthiness of potential
borrowers and thereby facilitate unsecured lending on reasonable terms to a credit union’s
members. The advances in information technology that have eroded the advantages of close
customer relationships in business lending, however, have likely also eroded the advantages
of small scale and common bond that traditionally have enabled credit unions to provide
ﬁnancial services to their members at low cost (Walter, 2006). Thus far, credit unions seem
to be adapting to the new environment. Since 1985, the share of U.S. depository institution
assets held by credit unions has nearly doubled, from 3.3 percent to 6.0 percent, and credit
union membership has increased faster than U.S. population, from 52 million members in
1985 to 93 million members in 2009. The Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998
may have facilitated the increase in membership by aﬃrming the right of credit unions to
accept members from unrelated groups. Since then, the number and size of credit unions
characterized by multiple common bonds has increased rapidly (Walter, 2006). Credit unions
1now hold about 10 percent of U.S. household savings deposits, 9 percent of all consumer
loans, and 13.2 percent of non-revolving consumer loans. Credit unions are also increasingly
a source of business loans, and legislation pending in Congress would permit credit unions
to oﬀer even more business loans by increasing the cap for such loans from 12.25 percent of
a credit union’s total assets to 25 percent.1
As with commercial banks, the evolving competitive environment appears to favor larger
credit unions, which have tended to grow more rapidly than smaller credit unions (Goddard
et al., 2002). Between 1985 and 2006, the average, inﬂation-adjusted total assets of U.S.
credit unions increased by more than 600 percent. U.S. credit unions held an average of
$84.6 million of assets in 2006 ($50.6 million in constant 1985 dollars) versus $7.8 million in
1985. Consolidation has also sharply reduced the total number of credit unions from a peak
of 23,866 in 1969 to just 8,662 in 2006. Further increases in scale seem likely because even
the largest credit unions appear to operate under increasing returns to scale (Wheelock and
Wilson, 2011). It remains an open question, however, whether credit unions, as a group,
will continue to gain market share. Much of their recent increase in market share has come
at the expense of savings and loan associations and savings banks, which saw a decline in
market share from 30.1 percent to 15.9 percent between 1985 and 2006. By contrast, the
share of industry assets held by commercial banks rose from 66.1 percent to 78.1 percent
over the same years. Credit unions are likely to continue to ﬁll a niche, but as an industry
may not thrive unless they can exploit new technologies to become more productive and
scale eﬃcient.
This paper investigates productivity growth among U.S. credit unions to assess how
successfully credit unions have contained costs while fulﬁlling the desire of their members
for favorable terms on loans and deposits. In this framework, we examine changes in cost-
productivity, i.e., the extent to which the cost of producing given levels of output has changed
over time. Credit unions become more cost-productive if the cost they incur to produce given
levels of outputs declines over time or, equivalently, if the levels of outputs they produce for a
given level of cost rises. We also estimate changes in cost and scale eﬃciency for credit unions.
1 H.R. 3380, the Promoting Lending to America’s Small Business Act was introduced in Congress during
July 2009 by Representative Paul Kanjorski. S. 2919, which would amend the Federal Credit Union Act,
was introduced by Sen. Mark Udall on December 21, 2009. Data on credit union membership, deposits and
loans are available from the Credit Union National Association: http//www.cuna.org/.
2Credit unions become more cost eﬃcient if they move closer to the eﬃcient frontier, and more
scale eﬃcient if they move closer to a region of the underlying technology characterized by
constant returns to scale. A credit union could become more cost or scale eﬃcient without
becoming more cost-productive as a result of an unfavorable shift in the technology that
increases the minimum feasible cost of producing given levels of outputs.
We specify a cost relationship for credit unions that takes account of the unique ob-
jectives of the owners of mutually-owned depository institutions for high deposit interest
rates and low loan interest rates. We estimate the cost relationship non-parametrically us-
ing a suitably adapted version of the “order-α quantile” frontier estimators developed by
Daouia (2003), Daouia and Simar (2007), and Wheelock and Wilson (2008). By using a
nonparametric estimator, we avoid the problem of specifying and estimating a potentially
incorrect parametric cost function.2 Further, unlike traditional nonparametric estimators,
such as data envelopment analysis (DEA), our nonparametric order-α quantile estimator has
a relatively rapid, root-n convergence rate (similar to parametric estimators) and is robust
to data outliers.3
We construct the cost analog of the familiar Malmquist productivity index, deﬁned in
terms of our nonparametric estimator, and decompose the index to allocate changes in cost-
productivity to changes in cost eﬃciency, technology and scale eﬃciency. In addition, we
decompose a residual term to gain insight into the sources of changes in scale eﬃciency. Our
results indicate that, in general, credit unions became less cost-productive between 1989 and
2006, indicating that they incurred higher (inﬂation-adjusted) operating costs to produce
given levels of output in 2006 than in 1989. We also ﬁnd that smaller credit unions tended
to experience larger declines in cost-productivity than large credit unions. Small credit
unions appear to have faced a shift in the cost frontier that increased the minimum cost of
producing given amounts of output. Although small credit unions, on average, became more
cost eﬃcient over time, they also became less scale eﬃcient. By contrast, the largest credit
unions became marginally less cost eﬃcient on average, but somewhat more scale eﬃcient.
Thus, our results are consistent with the conjecture that recent advances in technology and
2 Many studies have found that even relatively ﬂexible functional forms, such as the translog function,
are mis-speciﬁcations of cost relationships for banks and other depository institutions (e.g., McAllister and
McManus, 1993; Wheelock and Wilson, 2001; Wheelock and Wilson, 2011).
3 The root-n convergence rate obtains only if the estimator is used to estimate a partial frontier lying
close to the full frontier, which is the approach we take here.
3changes in regulation have favored larger credit unions.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 discusses recent literature on credit
union performance. Section 3 describes the variables in a credit union cost relationship and
presents our statistical model for estimation method. Section 4 deﬁnes measures of changes in
cost-productivity, eﬃciency, etc., and Section 5 reports and discusses the estimation results.
The ﬁnal section presents our conclusions.
2 Literature Review
The performance of U.S. credit unions has been evaluated on several dimensions. Most
studies assume that credit unions seek to minimize operating cost while maximizing member
beneﬁts in terms of the prices or variety of services they oﬀer.4 Fried et al. (1993), for
example, estimate the productive eﬃciency of credit unions in the context of a model in
which credit unions seek to maximize member beneﬁts in terms of the price, quantity and
variety of services oﬀered to members subject to resource availability and the operating
environment. The study employs a nonparametric free disposal hull (FDH) estimator and
data from 1990, and obtains a mean ineﬃciency estimate of 9.2 percent. That is, they ﬁnd
that, on average, credit unions are capable of producing 9.2 percent more service with the
amounts of variable resources available. Notably, the study also ﬁnds that larger credit
unions, measured in terms of total assets, are more eﬃcient than small credit unions.
Frame et al. (2003) also examine eﬃciency in the context of a model that assumes that
credit unions seek to minimize non-interest costs subject to input prices, the level and types
of output they produce, and the prevailing production technology. Based on estimation of a
parametric translog cost function using data from 1998 for credit unions with more than $50
million of total assets, Frame et al. (2003) ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the performance of
large credit unions with diﬀerent types of common bonds. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that credit
unions with residential common bonds have higher costs than those with occupational or
associational bonds.
Studies have also examined the eﬀects of mergers on credit union performance. For
4 See Smith et al. (1981), Smith (1984), Fried et al. (1993), Fried et al. (1999), Frame et al. (2003), and
Bauer (2008). A few studies have found some evidence of agency problems at credit unions to the detriment
of their members (Emmons and Schmid, 1999b; Frame et al., 2003; and Leggett and Strand, 2002). However,
we make no attempt here to distinguish between the interests of credit union managers and members.
4example, Fried et al. (1999) investigate the impact of mergers on credit union eﬃciency in
the context of a model in which credit unions seek to minimize cost while maximizing the
services provided to members. The study uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate
eﬃciency relative to a “member service performance” frontier, and ﬁnds that, on average,
credit unions that engage in acquisitions are more eﬃcient than those that are acquired.
Further, the study ﬁnds that members suﬀer no deterioration in service when their credit
union acquires another credit union, whereas members of acquired credit unions tend to
experience improved service.
Bauer et al. (2009) also examine the impact of mergers on credit union performance,
using the event study methodology for detecting changes in credit union performance of
Bauer (2008). Based on data for 1994–2004, the study ﬁnds that members of acquired credit
unions beneﬁt from higher deposit interest rates and lower loan interest rates compared with
expected rates based on pre-merger information. Further, the study ﬁnds that the interest
rates oﬀered by credit unions that make acquisitions are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by mergers.
Several studies investigate the relationship between credit union costs and ﬁrm size. Many
ﬁnd that average operating expenses decline as credit unions become larger (Emmons and
Schmid, 1999a; Leggett and Strand, 2002; Wilcox, 2006). Further, Goddard et al. (2008) ﬁnd
that larger credit unions are better able to diversify into non-traditional product lines, such
as business loans, credit cards and mutual funds, and that doing so reduces the volatility of
their earnings.
Wheelock and Wilson (2011) evaluate alternative measures of returns to scale for credit
unions using a cost relationship that takes account of the beneﬁt of high deposit interest
rates and low loan interest rates to credit union members, similar to the models of Fried
et al. (1993), Fried et al. (1999), and Frame et al. (2003). Wheelock and Wilson (2011) ﬁnd
that nearly all U.S. credit unions operate under increasing returns to scale, which seems
consistent with the faster average growth rates of total assets, membership and earnings
observed among larger U.S. credit unions (Goddard et al., 2002).5
5 Wheelock and Wilson (2011) estimate returns to scale both along a ray from the origin through the
median observed vector of credit union outputs (“ray-scale economies”) and along rays from the origin
through the observed output vector for each credit union (“expansion-path economies”). The study ﬁnds
evidence of rapidly increasing ray-scale economies below the median total assets of U.S. credit unions, but
near constant returns for larger credit unions. However, estimates of expansion-path scale economies, which
may better reﬂect scale economies near the combinations of inputs and outputs in actual credit union
5Although prior research has found some evidence that larger credit unions are more
eﬃcient and have lower average costs than small credit unions, studies have not investigated
changes in credit union performance over time except to compare performance before and
after mergers. Here we investigate changes in the cost-productivity and eﬃciency (both
cost and scale eﬃciency) of credit unions. We focus particularly on whether changes in
performance varied systematically across credit unions of diﬀerent sizes, as predicted by
studies discussing the eﬀects of recent changes in regulation and information technology.
3 Variable Speciﬁcation and Statistical Model
3.1 Model
Credit unions are mutual organizations that make loans, accept deposits, and provide other
services to their members. Whereas commercial banks attempt to maximize the spread
between interest paid on deposits and interest charged for loans, credit unions presumably
attempt to provide favorable terms on both loans and deposits to their members. Following
previous studies (e.g., Smith et al., 1981; Smith, 1984; Fried et al., 1993; Fried et al., 1999;
Frame et al., 2003; Bauer, 2008), we model credit unions as service providers that seek
to minimize non-interest costs (COST) subject to the prices of labor and capital input, the
prevailing production technology, and the level and types of output they produce. We specify
two variable output quantities, namely total loans (LOANS) (the sum of real estate loans,
commercial loans, and consumer loans) and other investments (INVEST). In addition, we
specify two quasi-ﬁxed outputs that reﬂect beneﬁts to members: savings pricing (PRSAV)
and loan pricing (PRLOAN). Following Frame et al. (2003), we specify the price dimension
of service to credit union members as the average interest rates on deposits and loans. Also
like Frame et al. (2003), our model includes as inputs ﬁnancial capital (CAP) and labor
(LAB) and the corresponding input-prices (WCAP and WLAB) faced by each credit union;
variable cost (COST) equals (WCAP×CAP)+(WLAB×LAB). Table 1 lists the variables
in our model and reports how each is deﬁned in terms of call report items.6
production, indicate that even the largest credit unions operate under increasing returns to scale.




















where x is a vector of production inputs, w is the corresponding vector of input prices, y1 is
a vector of variable outputs, and y2 is a vector of quasi-ﬁxed outputs. Using the reciprocal
of the loan pricing variable PRLOAN in (3.4) maintains increasing costs with respect to
output quantities.
We specify a cost relationship in terms of the output quantities and input prices deﬁned
above. We estimate the relationship non-parametrically using a modiﬁed version of the order-
α quantile frontier estimators of Daouia (2003), Aragon et al. (2005), Daouia and Simar
(2007), and Wheelock and Wilson (2008). Nonparametric estimation avoids the problem
of speciﬁcation error. As noted previously, even fairly ﬂexible function forms, such as the
translog function, have been found to mis-specify cost relationships for banks and credit
unions (e.g., Wheelock and Wilson, 2011). Of course, any eﬃciency estimates based on
estimation of a mis-speciﬁed model would be suspect.
Unlike DEA and similar nonparametric frontier estimators, which measure a ﬁrm’s per-
formance relative to an estimate of the eﬃcient frontier, order-α quantile estimators measure
eﬃciency in terms of a quantile lying “near” the eﬃcient frontier. The advantage of using
order-α quantile estimators is that, unlike DEA and other traditional nonparametric frontier
estimators, order-α quantile estimators are both robust to data outliers and have the rapid
root-n convergence rate of linear parametric estimators.
Because order-α quantile estimators are fairly new and have been used less frequently
than DEA and similar nonparametric methods, we next describe in some detail our statistical
model and distance function measures.
73.2 Ineﬃciency Measurement
Given vectors x ∈ R
p
+ of p input quantities and y ∈ R
q
+ of q output quantities, standard
microeconomic theory of the ﬁrm posits a production set at time t represented by
P
t ≡ {(x,y) | x can produce y at time t}. (3.5)
This set represents the set of feasible combinations of inputs and outputs at a given point in
time, and may change with the passage of time. We assume throughout that the production
set Pt is free-disposal, i.e., if (x,y) ∈ Pt, then (  x,   y) ∈ Pt ∀   x ≥ x and 0 ≤   y ≤ y. We
also assume throughout that all production requires the use of strictly positive levels of some
inputs; i.e., (x,y) ̸∈ Pt if x = 0 and y ≥ 0, y ̸= 0. These assumptions are standard in
microeconomic theory; e.g., see Shephard (1970) or F¨ are (1988).7
It is often assumed in addition that P is closed. Then the upper boundary of Pt, denoted
P∂t, is referred to as the technology or production frontier, and is deﬁned by
P
∂t
= {(x,y) | (x,y) ∈ P
t, (γ
−1x,γy) ̸∈ P ∀ γ > 1}. (3.6)
Free disposability of the production set Pt implies monotonicity of the frontier P∂t.
Firms face input prices w ∈ R
p
++ corresponding to the inputs represented in x. For a
given input-price vector w,
C(w,P
t) = {(w
′x,y) | (x,y) ∈ P} (3.7)
is the set of feasible combinations of cost and outputs. Note that C(w,Pt) ⊂ R
q+1
+ . The set
C(w,Pt) is completely determined by Pt and the given input price vector w. Free dispos-
ability of Pt implies a type of free disposability for C(w,Pt); i.e., if (w′x,y) ∈ C(w,Pt),
then (w′  x,   y) ∈ C(w,Pt) ∀   x ≥ x and 0 ≤   y ≤ y. If Pt is assumed closed and convex, then
C(w,Pt) must also be closed and convex. If Pt is closed, then we can replace Pt in (3.7)







which forms the lower boundary of the set C(w,Pt).
7 Throughout, we deﬁne inequalities involving vectors on an element-by-element basis; e.g., for   x, x ∈ R
p
+,
  x ≥ x means that some number ℓ ∈ {0, 1, ..., p} of the corresponding elements of   x and x are equal, while
(p − ℓ) of the elements of   x are greater than the corresponding elements of x.
8The minimum cost of producing output levels y from quantities of inputs x at prices
w ∈ R
p





′x | w, (w
′x,y) ∈ C(w,P
t)}. (3.9)
A standard measure of cost eﬃciency for a ﬁrm facing input prices w and using input














F¨ are et al. (1985) refer to the inverse of ρ(w′x,y | w,Pt) as “overall” eﬃciency.
The standard measure of cost ineﬃciency deﬁned in (3.10) holds output levels ﬁxed.
However, just as technical eﬃciency can be measured in various directions, cost eﬃciency





















to measure cost eﬃciency. These measures are illustrated in Figure 1 for a given, constant
input-price vector w and a single output quantity. The curve passing through points B,
D, and E is the (minimum) cost function C(y | C(w,Pt)) deﬁned in (3.9). For the cost-
ineﬃcient ﬁrm operating at point A, the standard measure of cost eﬃciency deﬁned in (3.10)
gives a cost ineﬃciency measure ρ = AC
AB > 1. The output cost eﬃciency measure deﬁned in
(3.11) gives τ = FE
FA > 1, while the hyperbolic cost eﬃciency measure deﬁned in (3.12) yields
κ = AC
AG = FH
FA. Here, τ is the feasible proportion by which output could be expanded while
holding costs constant, whereas κ is the feasible equi-proportionate reduction in costs and
simultaneous increase in output.
The hyperbolic measure deﬁned in (3.12) is the cost analog of the hyperbolic technical
eﬃciency measures considered by F¨ are et al. (1985), Wheelock and Wilson (2008), and Wilson
(2009). The advantages of the hyperbolic cost eﬃciency measure in (3.12) are similar to those
of its hyperbolic technical eﬃciency counterpart; see Wilson (2011) for discussion.
9Our model of credit union activities described in Section 3.1 treats some credit union








where y1 ∈ R
q−r
+ , y2 ∈ Rr
+, and r ∈ {0, 1, ..., q} is the number of quasi-ﬁxed outputs,
r ≤ q. Now consider a credit union facing input prices w and operating at (x,y) ∈ Pt. In
order to deal with quasi-ﬁxed outputs while retaining some of the ﬂavor of the hyperbolic











to measure cost eﬃciency. The measure γ(w′x,y | C(w,Pt)) gives the feasible, simultaneous,
proportionate reduction in cost w′x and increase in variable outputs y1 holding quasi-ﬁxed
outputs y2 constant.8
The various measures that have been introduced so far are unobserved, and must be
estimated from a random sample St
n = {Xi,Y i}n
i=1 of input-output vectors at time t. We
assume Pr((Xi,Y i) ∈ Pt) = 1 for each (Xi,Y i) ∈ St
n. It is well-known that Pt, and hence
C(w,Pt), can be estimated by the free disposal hull (FDH) estimator proposed by Deprins
et al. (1984) or the data envelopment analysis (DEA) estimator proposed by Farrell (1957).
These estimators envelop all of the sample observations; consequently, the corresponding
eﬃciency estimators are sensitive to outliers or extreme values in the data. In addition,
both FDH and DEA estimators of Pt, as well as the corresponding eﬃciency estimators,
suﬀer from the well-known curse of dimensionality.9 Two alternatives to FDH and DEA
estimators have been developed. Cazals et al. (2002) introduced the notion of order-m
8 Unlike the distance function deﬁned in (3.12), in which all input prices and output quantities are
variable, the distance function in (3.14) holds y2 ﬁxed. This distance function is similar to the directional
distance function introduced by Chambers et al. (1996, 1998), except that eﬃciency is measured along a
hyperbolic path in the (q + 1)-dimensional subspace spanned by (w′x,y1) instead of along a linear path as
in the case of directional distance functions.
9 See Park et al. (2000) for assumptions required for consistency of the corresponding FDH eﬃciency
estimator and its asymptotic properties. See Kneip et al. (2008) and Park et al. (2010) for assumptions
required for consistency of the corresponding DEA eﬃciency estimator and its asymptotic properties under
variable returns to scale and constant returns to scale. Park et al. (2000) establish a convergence rate of
n−1=(p+q) for the FDH eﬃciency estimator, while Kneip et al. (2008) establish a rate of n−2=(p+q+1) under
variable returns to scale. Under constant returns to scale, the convex-cone version of the DEA estimator is
shown by Park et al. (2010) to converge at rate n−2=(p+q).
10partial frontiers, while Daouia (2003), Aragon et al. (2005), and Daouia and Simar (2007)
introduced the concept of order-α partial frontiers that envelop most, but not all, sample
observations and consequently avoid the extreme sensitivity to outliers encountered with
FDH and DEA estimators. Aragon et al. (2005) and Daouia and Ruiz-Gazen (2006) show
that partial frontiers based on α-quantile estimators have robustness properties superior to
those of partial frontiers based on order-m estimators.
In order to adapt the order-α idea to our setting, we use the probabilistic framework
introduced by Cazals et al. (2002) and extended by Daraio and Simar (2005b). In particular,
for random input-output vectors (X,Y ) ∈ St
n, we posit a joint probability measure leading
to the distribution function
H
t(x,y) = Pr(X ≤ x,Y ≥ y) (3.15)
at time t. As noted by Daouia and Simar (2007), this distribution function completely
characterizes the data-generating process. Given the assumption Pr((X,Y ) ∈ Pt) = 1
introduced earlier, Ht(x,y) has support over Dt ⊆ Pt. As noted by Kneip et al. (2008), in
most situations Dt will equal Pt, but we allow for the possibility that Dt is a strict subset
of Pt.10





′x,Y ≥ y) (3.16)
with support over the set Kt = {(w′x,y | (x,y) ∈ Dt} ⊆ C(w,Pt). Clearly, Ht is monotone,
non-decreasing in x and monotone, non-increasing in y; therefore, Gt is monotone, non-
decreasing in w′x and monotone, non-increasing in y. The domain of Gt(w′x,y) has (q+1)
dimensions, whereas the domain of Ht(x,y) has (p+q) dimensions. Although the α-quantile
estimator we use is root-n consistent, decreasing the number of dimensions should reduce its
variance.





′x, Y 1 ≥ y1 | Y 2 ≥ y2)
      
=Gt(w′x,y1|y2)
Pr(Y 2 ≥ y2)
      
=St(y2)
, (3.17)
10 In particular, the proof given by Park et al. (2000) of consistency of the FDH eﬃciency estimator
requires that Dt be a compact set, implying Dt ⊂ Pt. For similar reasons, compactness of Dt is also needed
to link order-α estimators to FDH estimators (as α → 1) as in Daouia and Simar (2007) and Wheelock and
Wilson (2008).
11where Y has been partitioned into components Y 1 and Y 2 as in (3.13). The ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side of (3.17) is a conditional distribution function, while the second term is the
joint survivor function for the quasi-ﬁxed outputs y2. Then for all y such that St(y2) > 0,















since Gt(w′x,y) has bounded support on Kt ⊆ C(w,Pt).11 More importantly, for all y such






γ > 0 | G
t(γ
−1w
′x,γy1 | y2) > (1 − α)
}
. (3.19)
This distance function blends features of the conditional input- and output-oriented order-α
quantile eﬃciency measures proposed by Daouia (2003), Aragon et al. (2005) and Daouia and
Simar (2007), and the unconditional hyperbolic order-α quantile distance function deﬁned
by Wheelock and Wilson (2008). For a unit operating at (w′x,y) ∈ C(w,Pt), and for
γα = γα(w′x,y | C(w,Pt)) (>,<) 1, the distance function deﬁned by (3.19) gives the
simultaneous, proportionate (decrease, increase) in cost w′x and (increase, decrease) in
variable outputs y1 (holding quasi-ﬁxed outputs y2 constant) that would result in the ﬁrm
being dominated by units incurring (weakly) less cost than γαw′x and producing (weakly)
more than γαy1 variable output while producing y2 quasi-ﬁxed output with probability





) ∈ C(w,Pt) by the free-
disposability assumption.13





11 Similar representations of input, output, hyperbolic, and directional distance functions have been made
by Daraio and Simar (2005a), Daouia and Simar (2007), Wilson (2011), and Simar and Vanhems (2012).
12 Deprins et al. (1984) introduced the concept of dominance in the production setting.
13 It might be tempting to deﬁne an unconditional measure along the lines of Wheelock and Wilson (2008),
with eﬃciency measured along a hyperbolic path in the subspace spanned by (w′x,y1). For example, one
could write
δ(w′x,y | C(w,Pt)) ≡ sup
{
δ > 0 | Gt(δ−1w′x,δy1,y2) > (1 − α)
}
where again α ∈ (0,1]. However, this distance function may not exist. In particular, for some points, it is
possible that Gt(δ−1w′x,δy1,y2) ≤ (1 − α) ∀ δ > 0; in other words, there might be insuﬃcient probability
mass in some regions of the support of Gt to allow any scaling of the point (w′x,y1,y2) along the path
(δ−1w′x,δy1,y2), δ > 0, such that the probability given by Gt(δ−1w′x,δy1,y2) can be made greater than
(1 − α). Consequently, we use the conditional measure deﬁned in (3.19).



















In the language of Daouia and Simar (2007), C∂
α(w,Pt) is the set of eﬃcient cost-output
combinations at the level (α × 100)-percent. Points (w′x,y) ∈ C∂
α(w,Pt) have probability
Gt(w′x,y) ≤ 1 − α of being dominated if Gt(·,·) is continuous on Kt.
The set C∂




















This set is the order-α analog of the cost set introduced in (3.7); hence we call Cα(w,Pt) the
conditional, hyperbolic cost set of order-α. Clearly, Cα(w,Pt) ⊆ C(w,Pt), with Cα(w,Pt) ⊂
C(w,Pt)) ∀ α ∈ (0,1).
Although cost eﬃciency is typically measured relative to the frontier C∂(w,Pt), other
benchmarks, such as C∂
α(w,Pt), can be used. Using the hyperbolic order-α quantile C∂
α(w,Pt)
as a benchmark oﬀers several advantages; in particular, convergence is faster and, as ex-
plained below, inference is much simpler than when we use the cost frontier C∂(w,Pt) as the
benchmark.
3.3 Estimation
Since Pt and hence the other quantities that have been discussed here are unknown, they
must be estimated from an observed sample St
n = {(Xi,Y i)}
n
i=1 of data on ﬁrms’ input
and output quantities at time t. We assume that the observations in St
n are identically,
independently distributed random draws from the distribution function Ht(·,·) introduced
above in Section 3.2.
Wilson (2011) and Simar and Vanhems (2012) use simple transformations to prove con-
sistency and other results for hyperbolic and directional distance measures. The idea is to
transform the coordinate space in such a way that the problem becomes identical, in the
new coordinate system, to one for which estimators with nice statistical properties have been
developed. We use a similar device here.











v = y2, (3.23)
and y
−1
1 denotes the vector of length (q − r) containing the inverses of the elements of y1.
Let Cϕ(w,Pt)) ∈ R
q+1
+ denote the set of points given by applying the transformation ϕ to
every point in C(w,Pt). This transformation also induces a distribution function Gt
ϕ(u,v) =
Pr(U ≤ u,V ≥ v), which is a transformation of Gt(w′x,y) deﬁned in (3.16) and which has
support on Kt
ϕ, the set of points obtained by applying the transformation ϕ to every point
in Kt. Moreover, analogous to (3.17), Gt
ϕ(u,v) can be decomposed by writing
G
t
ϕ(u,v) = Pr(U ≤ u | V ≥ v)








Since the transformation ϕ is monotonic, Gt(w′x,y) = Gt
ϕ(u,v) for u, v deﬁned as
in (3.22)–(3.23), and quantiles are stable with respect to monotonic transformations such
as ϕ. Given free disposability of Pt, it is easy to verify that Cϕ(w,Ψt) is free-disposal in
the sense that if (u,v) ∈ Cϕ(w,Ψt), then (  u,  v) ∈ Cϕ(w,Ψt) ∀   u ≥ u and 0 ≤   v ≤ v.
In addition, the decomposition in (3.24) is identical to the decomposition that appears in
Daouia and Simar (2007, p. 378, ﬁrst line of second equation). Consequently, the distance
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where θα(u,v) is the α-quantile input eﬃciency score deﬁned in Daouia and Simar ((2007),
p. 379, Deﬁnition 2.1). In other words, the conditional α-quantile hyperbolic distance func-
tion deﬁned in (3.19) for a unit operating at (w′x,y) ∈ Ct(w,Pt) is equivalent to the recip-
rocal of the α-quantile input eﬃciency score deﬁned by Daouia and Simar when evaluated
at (u,v) ∈ Cϕ(w,Pt).
Note that in the (u,v)-coordinates, Cϕ(w,Pt) satisﬁes the same property as the pro-
duction set Pt in (x,y)-coordinates. Hence γα(w′x,y | C(w,Pt) can be estimated by the
14reciprocal of the non-parametric estimator of the α-quantile input eﬃciency score discussed
in Daouia and Simar (2007, Section 3) after transforming the data as described above. For
ﬁxed values of α strictly less than one, the estimator is strongly consistent, asymptotically
normal, and converges at rate n1/2 under the assumptions introduced in Section 3.2 and
additional mild assumptions given by Daouia and Simar.
4 Measuring Changes in Performance
Although cost eﬃciency is measured at a point in time, it is often interesting to evaluate how
eﬃciency, productivity, and other measures of performance evolve over time. In competitive
industries, one would expect ineﬃcient ﬁrms to be driven from the market, although this
does not happen instantaneously and ﬁrms that are ineﬃcient today might become more
eﬃcient tomorrow and vice-versa. In the case of non-proﬁt organizations, such as credit
unions, competitive pressures that would encourage eﬃcient operation may be absent or
operate diﬀerently than they do for proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms.
In a production framework with only one input and one output, average product is deﬁned
as the ratio of output to input quantities. If P∂t exhibits constant returns to scale everywhere,
then productivity and technical eﬃciency are equivalent, although they might be measured
diﬀerently. With variable returns to scale, however, technically eﬃcient ﬁrms operating along
P∂t in regions of either increasing or decreasing returns to scale will be less productive than
technically eﬃcient ﬁrms operating along the constant-returns region of P∂t; they might also
be less productive than some technically ineﬃcient ﬁrms.
Simple ratios are not useful for measuring productivity in cases of multiple inputs and
multiple outputs. Instead, Malmquist productivity (MP) indices are often used to measure
changes in productivity. Recent examples in the banking literature include Alam (2001),
Berg et al. (1992), Portela and Thanassoulis (2010), Wheelock and Wilson (1999), and
Wheelock and Wilson (2009).
In a cost framework with only one output, average cost is simply cost divided by the
single output quantity, and it is trivial to see how average cost changes over time. With
multiple outputs, however, an index similar to the MP index is needed to provide a measure
of change in cost-productivity, which is the multivariate analog of average cost. Recently, Ball
et al. (2005) introduced a Malmquist cost-productivity (MCP) index to measure productivity
15growth within a cost framework similar to the framework developed above in Section 3.14
They note that “since the cost structure of an industry is a fundamental determinant of cost-
eﬀective production decisions, a cost framework as used in MCP is a desirable foundation for
representing production patterns and analyzing the productive contributions of... outputs
and inputs to production.”
Here we extend the ideas of Ball et al. (2005) to deﬁne a MCP index in terms of the
partial cost frontier C∂
α(w,Pt) deﬁned in (3.20), as opposed to the full cost frontier C∂(w,Pt)
deﬁned in (3.8). We also deﬁne our MCP index in terms of hyperbolic eﬃciency measures,
rather than in terms of the usual input- or output-oriented eﬃciency measures. Hyperbolic
eﬃciency measures have an important advantage in that the hyperbolic-based index is always
deﬁned, whereas an MP index deﬁned using input- or output- measures may not exist for
some points when the technology shifts or rotates over time.15
Our approach to measuring cost-productivity allows both cost and some outputs to vary.
In so doing, we avoid problems of infeasibility (i.e., existence) in the cross-period distance
functions used to deﬁne components of the Malmquist cost-productivity index. Infeasibilities
occur when all outputs are held constant and the cost frontier shifts so that a ray parallel
to the cost axis from a credit union’s location in one period does not intersect the estimated
frontier in the other period. This problem was noted by Ball et al. (2005, p. 380), who worked
in the cost direction while holding output quantities ﬁxed. Given that infeasibilities often
occur in cross-period studies such as ours when output quantities are held ﬁxed, researchers
in other applications should ﬁnd our approach useful.
MP and MCP indices must be deﬁned in terms of constant returns to scale to properly
measure productivity changes in either the production or cost framework, and to allow the
index to be interpreted in terms of total factor productivity.16 Let V(Pt) denote the convex
cone (with vortex at the origin) of the production set Pt so that P ⊆ V(Pt). Then P∂t
displays globally constant returns to scale if and only if P = V(Pt). Otherwise, P ⊂ V(Pt)
and Pt is characterized by variable returns to scale. Using notation introduced in Section 3,
we can write the MCP index introduced by Ball et al. (2005) for ﬁrm i deﬁned in terms of
14 A similar index was used by Edvardsen et al. (2006).
15 See Wheelock and Wilson (2009) for additional discussion and an example of the use of hyperbolic
eﬃciency measures to deﬁne an MP index in terms of distances to partial frontiers.
16 See F¨ are and Grosskopf (1996) and Ball et al. (2005) for discussion.








































where superscripts have been added to denote quantities at times t1 and t2. Note that we
use the eﬃciency measure deﬁned in (3.10) to deﬁne M
t1,t2
ρ,i , but with V(C(w,Pt)) replacing
C(w,Pt) in (3.10).
MCP (and MP) indices can be deﬁned in terms of various benchmarks, including either
the full frontier P∂t or the partial frontier C∂
α(w,Pt). Working in a hyperbolic direction
while conditioning on quasi-ﬁxed outputs, we deﬁne an MCP index in terms of the partial

















































where γ(w′x,y | V(Cα(w,Pt))) is deﬁned by replacing C(w,Pt) in (3.14) with the convex





i (α) measure changes in cost-productivity between times t1 and
t2, and both consist of the geometric mean of two ratios of distance functions. They diﬀer
only in terms of the speciﬁc distance functions used to deﬁne the index. The distance
functions used to deﬁne M
t1,t2
ρ,i measure cost eﬃciency holding output levels ﬁxed, while the
distance functions used to deﬁne M
t1,t2
i (α) allow outputs to vary. Use of the convex hull
operator V(·) in both indices means that eﬃciency is measured relative to constant returns
to scale technologies in all cases, which is necessary for proper measurement of changes in
productivity.
















i ) ∈ Pt2 in the second period.






provides a second ﬁxed benchmark against which to measure changes in cost-productivity.
If M
t1,t2
i (α) > 1, then the cost-productivity of ﬁrm i has increased between time t1 and
t2. However, if M
t1,t2
i (α) < 1, then cost-productivity has decreased, and if M
t1,t2
i (α) = 1,
17then cost-productivity has not changed. Similar reasoning applies in the case of the index
in (4.26).
In the literature, MP indices have been decomposed in a variety of ways to examine
changes in eﬃciency, technology, and other aspects of performance. Here, we decompose the
MCP index deﬁned in (4.27) along the lines of the MP-index decomposition in Wheelock
and Wilson (1999). In particular, using the cost-eﬃciency measure deﬁned in (3.19), the



















A value greater than (equal to, less than) 1 indicates an increase (no change, a decrease) in
cost eﬃciency over the period from t1 to t2.
Analogous to changes in technology (i.e., changes in the full frontier Pt∂), changes in the




































This index also consists of a geometric mean of two ratios. The ﬁrst ratio on the RHS of
(4.29) measures the extent to which the order-α cost frontier deﬁned in (3.20) shifted between
t1 and t2 along the hyperbolic path through the ith ﬁrm’s position at time t1. Similarly,
the second ratio measures the shift in the cost frontier along the hyperbolic path through
the same ﬁrm’s location at time t2. If T
t1,t2
i (α) > 1, then the cost frontier shifts downward
between t1 and t2, creating the potential for a reduction in cost. If T
t1,t2
i (α) < 1, then the
cost frontier shifts upward, reﬂecting an increase in the minimum cost of producing given
amounts of output. No change is indicated by T
t1,t2
i (α) = 1.
The MCP index can be decomposed still further. For example, the decomposition used

































i (α) = U
t1,t2




































































Some algebra conﬁrms that M
t1,t2
i (α) = E
t1,t2
i (α) × T
t1,t2
i (α) × S
t1,t2








i (α) deﬁned in (4.30) consists of a ratio of two scale eﬃciency mea-
sures; the numerator is a measure of scale eﬃciency for ﬁrm i at time t1, and the denominator
measures scale eﬃciency for ﬁrm i at time t2. By construction, both scale eﬃciency measures
are necessarily weakly greater than 1, with larger (smaller) values indicating greater (less)
scale ineﬃciency. The ratio in (4.30) provides a measure of the change in scale eﬃciency
experienced by ﬁrm i between time t1 and time t2. Values of S
t1,t2
i (α) greater than (less
than) 1 indicate that ﬁrm i has become more (less) scale eﬃcient between times t1 and t2,
while a value of 1 indicates no change in scale eﬃciency. Note that a ﬁrm could become more
scale eﬃcient (i) by moving closer to the most-productive scale size (MPSS), i.e., the region
where returns to scale are constant, or (ii) if the MPSS moves closer to the ﬁrm’s location
in the cost set due to changes in the shape or position of the technology (or, as deﬁned here,
the order-α quantile). Of course, any change in scale eﬃciency would reﬂect the net eﬀect
of any movement of the ﬁrm and changes in technology.
The residual terms U
t1,t2
i (α) and V
t1,t2
i (α) deﬁned in (4.31) and (4.32) are useful for
identifying the reasons for any changes in scale eﬃciency. The expression inside the square
brackets on the RHS of (4.31) is a ratio of two scale eﬃciency measures, similar to (4.30). The
numerator of (4.31) is a measure ﬁrm i’s scale eﬃciency at time t1 based on the technology
available at time t1. The denominator is also a measure based on ﬁrm i’s location at time
t1, but relative to the technology available at time t2. Hence, because the ﬁrm’s position
is held ﬁxed, any change indicated by U
t1,t2
i (α) reﬂects movement in the position or shape
of the order-α cost quantile C∂
α(w,Pt) deﬁned in (3.20). As in (4.30), the scale eﬃciency
measures in the numerator and denominator of (4.31) are by construction weakly greater
than 1. Values of U
t1,t2
i (α) greater than (equal to, less than) 1 imply that ﬁrm i would have
experienced a decrease (no change, an increase) in scale eﬃciency between times t1 and t2 if
it had been at its time t1 location in (w′x,y)-space at both times t1 and t2.
The term V
t1,t2
i (α) in (4.32) is deﬁned similarly to U
t1,t2
i (α), except that the scale eﬃ-
19ciency measures that deﬁne V
t1,t2
i (α) hold ﬁrm i’s position ﬁxed at its location at time t2
instead of t1. Similar reasoning reveals that values of V
t1,t2
i (α) greater than (equal to, less
than) 1 imply that ﬁrm i would have experienced a decrease (no change, an increase) in scale
eﬃciency between times t1 and t2 if it had been at its time t2 location at both times t1 and
t2.











i (α), and V
t1,t2
i (α) deﬁned in (4.27)–(4.32), are not observed and therefore must be
estimated. Consistent estimates of the α-quantile distance functions based on C(wt,Pt)
used in (4.28)–(4.32) can be obtained as described earlier in Section 3.3, while the distance
functions based on the convex hull of sets deﬁned by (3.21) can be estimated as described
in Appendix A.
5 Data and Estimation Results
We use data on credit unions that are observed in both 1989 and 2006. We screened for
obvious data problems and omitted observations for credit unions that reported non-positive
values for loans or investments, or where the calculated values for WCAP, WLAB, PRSAV,
or PRLOAN are outside the interval (0,1) or those for CAP or LAB are non-positive,
leaving 7,219 matched observations for 1989 and 2006. Table 2 reports summary statistics
for the variables in our model.17 The minimum and maximum values displayed in Table 2
are in some cases rather extreme. However, we were conservative in deleting implausible
observations since screening data for implausible observations is always subjective to some
extent and our estimators are robust with respect to outliers.
Empirical application of the order-α quantile estimator requires the choice of one or more
values for α. Daouia and Simar (2007) and Wheelock and Wilson (2009) consider various val-
ues for α near, but less than, 1.0, and ﬁnd that the choice makes little diﬀerence qualitatively
in their empirical results. Similarly, here we computed contemporaneous eﬃciency estimates
using values of α ∈ {0.95, 0.96, ..., 0.99} for our sample of U.S. credit unions. Figure 2
shows scatter plots of contemporaneous hyperbolic order-α quantile eﬃciency estimates for
several values of α for the years 1989 and 2006. The eﬃciency estimates for diﬀerent values
17 Quarterly call report data for credit unions are available from the National Credit Union Administration:
http://www.ncua.gov/DataServices/FOIA/5300CallReportData.aspx.
20of α are highly correlated, as indicated by the fact that points in the scatter plots tend to
lie near 45-degree lines, suggesting that our results will depend little, if at all, on the choice
of α. Indeed, we ﬁnd that qualitatively our results are largely invariant to the choice of α;
hence, we report estimates based only on α = 0.95.18
We computed estimates of the Malmquist cost-productivity index deﬁned in (4.27) and its
various components by replacing the unknown distance function values in (4.27)–(4.32) with
estimates computed using the strategy described in Appendix A. Tables 3–8 report geometric
means of estimates for the Malmquist index and its various components over observations
grouped by quintiles of total assets in 1989 (rows) and 2006 (columns). Quintile Q1 consists
of credit unions in the smallest-size quintile in a given year, Q2 consists of those in the
next smallest size-quintile, etc.19 In addition to the geometric means, the cells of each table
report in parentheses the number of credit unions in each quintile across the two periods. For
example, there were 1,119 credit unions with total assets among the smallest 20 percent of
all credit unions in both 1989 and 2006, 279 credit unions with assets among the smallest 20
percent in 1989 (Q1) but among the second-smallest 20 percent in 2006 (Q2), and 39 credit
unions with assets among the smallest 20 percent in 1989 (Q1) but among the third-smallest
20 percent in 2006 (Q3), etc.
Table 3 reports means of estimated changes in cost-productivity for credit unions be-
tween 1989 and 2006. We used standard bootstrapping methods to determine statistical
signiﬁcance of the means (i.e., signiﬁcant diﬀerences from 1.0), which is indicated in the
table by asterisks.20 The results indicate that cost-productivity tended to fall among credit
unions in all size groups, but on average, smaller credit unions experienced the largest de-
18 Estimates corresponding to α = 0.96, ..., 0.99 are available in a separate appendix (Appendix B)
available from the authors on request.
19 The quintiles of total assets consist of credit unions with total assets in the following ranges: for 1989,
$97,038–$2,379,546; $2,379,546–$5,758,445; $5,758,445–$12,341,856; $12,341,856–$33,085,534; $33,085,534–
$5,504,010,913; for 2006, $115,848–$3,512,487; $3,512,487–$9,204,064; $9,204,064–$22,949,767; $22,949,767–
$67,414,680; $67,414,680–$25,754,336,720 (all ﬁgures in constant year 2000 dollars).
20 Speciﬁcally, we draw from the empirical distribution of our data by selecting credit unions (uniformly,
independently, and with replacement) to build a bootstrap pseudo data set. On a particular draw, if the ith
credit union is selected, then its observations in both 1989 and 2006 enter the pseudo data. Once the pseudo
data have been constructed, distances are measured from observations in the original data to quantiles
estimated from the pseudo data, analogous to the original estimation. After 2,000 bootstrap replications,
we use the various bootstrap values to estimate conﬁdence intervals using the bias-correction described by
Efron and Tibshirani (1993). Signiﬁcant diﬀerence from 1 is determined by whether an estimated conﬁdence
interval includes 1.
21clines. For example, cost-productivity fell by an average 30.3 percent ((1.0 − 0.6969)× 100)
for credit unions in the smallest-size quintile (Q1) in both 1989 and 2006, but by just 8.2
percent ((1.0 − 0.9176) × 100) for credit unions located in the largest-size quintile (Q5) in
both periods. With the exception of the two credit unions that moved from Q2 in 1989 to
Q5 in 2006, credit unions moving to a larger-size quintile between 1989 and 2006 tended
to exhibit smaller declines in cost-productivity than those remaining in the same quintile
or moving to a smaller-size quintile. For example, productivity fell by an average of 18.2
percent among the 914 credit unions in Q4 in both 1989 and 2006, but by just 7.7 percent
among those moving from Q4 to Q5. Our results are thus consistent with the view that en-
vironmental changes, such as improvements in information-processing and credit-monitoring
technologies and changes in regulation, have tended to favor larger ﬁnancial ﬁrms over their
smaller competitors.
Next we examine changes in eﬃciency and technology for further insights into changes
in the performance of credit unions of diﬀerent sizes. Table 4 reports means of estimated
changes in cost eﬃciency for credit unions in each asset-size quintile. Here we ﬁnd that the
largest credit unions—those in Q5 in both 1989 and 2006—experienced an average decline
in cost eﬃciency of 5.3 percent ((1.0 − 0.9474) × 100). By contrast, smaller credit unions
tended to become more cost eﬃcient, except those moving from Q1 in 1989 to either Q2 or
Q3 in 2006. Moreover, the improvements in cost eﬃciency tended to be large, ranging from
an average of 4.3 percent for credit unions moving from Q5 to Q4, to 43.2 percent for the
one credit union moving from Q1 to Q5.
Results for the mean changes in technology, reported in Table 5, help to reconcile the
results for changes in productivity and eﬃciency. The mean changes in technology for the
largest credit unions—those located in Q5 in 2006—are not statistically diﬀerent from 1.0
(except for the one credit union that moved from Q1 in the 1989 to Q5 in 2006), although the
point estimates suggest some improvement in technology between 1989 and 2006. However,
the mean changes in technology are mostly less than 1.0 for smaller credit unions, indicat-
ing that an unfavorable shift in the cost frontier can explain the simultaneous declines in
cost-productivity and increases in cost eﬃciency experienced by many smaller credit unions
between 1989 and 2006. Although many small credit unions incurred higher costs in produc-
ing given amounts of output, and therefore became less cost-productive, shifts in technology
22reduced their distance from the cost frontier, which made them more cost eﬃcient.
Those credit unions moving from one of the smaller quintiles in 1989 to Q5 in 2006
experienced (on average) increases in cost eﬃciency as indicated by the results in Table
4 as well as possible improvements in technology, but also declines (on average) in cost-
productivity, as indicated by the results in Table 3. Our results for changes in scale eﬃciency
and its sub-components, reported in Tables 6–8, help resolve this apparent paradox.
Table 6 reports estimates of changes in scale eﬃciency over 1989–2006. Our results
indicate that most credit unions experienced either declines or no statistically signiﬁcant
changes in scale eﬃciency, indicated by mean values less than 1.0. Only two groups (the
single credit union that moved from Q1 to Q5, and those that were in Q5 in both periods)
show improvements in scale eﬃciency, and only one of these is statistically signiﬁcant.
Recall from the discussion in Section 4 that a credit union would become more scale
eﬃcient if (i) it moved closer to a region of constant returns to scale or (ii) a region of
constant returns to scale shifted closer to the credit union’s location in the cost space. To
help disentangle these two eﬀects, we turn to the results in Tables 7 and 8. The results
for the residual term U
t1,t2
i (α) reported in Table 7 indicate that, on average, credit unions
located in quintiles Q2–Q5 in 1989 would have experienced declines in scale eﬃciency had
they remained at their 1989 locations in (w′x,y)-space. The estimates in Table 7 are large
and statistically signiﬁcant for the largest size-quintiles. For example, credit unions in Q5 in
both years would have experienced an average decline in scale eﬃciency of about 246 percent
if they had remained at their 1989 locations in (w′x,y)-space in 2006.
The results in Table 8 show what would have happened to scale eﬃciency if credit unions
had been at their 2006 locations in the cost space in both 1989 and 2006. Credit unions in
Q3–Q5 in both years would have experienced substantial and statistically signiﬁcant improve-
ments (on average) in scale eﬃciency had they been at their 2006 locations in (w′x,y)-space
in 1989. These results indicate that many credit unions moved to regions in the cost-space
where scale economies showed improvement between 1989 and 2006. Nonetheless, recalling
the results for changes in scale eﬃciency shown in Table 6, it appears that, on average, only
the largest credit unions became more scale eﬃcient between 1989 and 2006 (and even then,
mean improvement was not generally statistically signiﬁcant). In other words, although
larger credit unions tended to move to locations where scale eﬃciency improved, the extent
23of improvement at those locations was insuﬃcient to produce statistically signiﬁcant gains
in scale eﬃciency for most credit unions.
The smallest credit unions, i.e., those in Q1 in 2006, experienced the largest average
declines in scale eﬃciency over time. Interestingly, our results indicate that credit unions in
Q1 in both 1989 and 2006 would have experienced no change, on average, in scale eﬃciency
if they had merely remained at their 1989 location in (w′x,y)-space in both years. However,
they would have experienced an average decline in cost eﬃciency of about 11 percent if they
had been at the 2006 locations in both periods, and because of their movement within the
cost space, these credit unions experienced an average decline in cost eﬃciency of about 20
percent. Taken as a whole, our results indicate that smaller credit unions, and those which
dropped from larger- to smaller-size quintiles, fared less well than their larger and faster-
growing competitors in terms of scale eﬃciency, as well as cost-productivity and changes in
technology.
Our estimation results reveal substantial changes in the cost productivity, eﬃciency,
technology, and scale eﬃciency of credit unions over the 17 year period 1989–2006. We
investigated whether these changes occurred primarily in either the early or later years of













i (α) separately for 1989–1997 and for 1997–2006. We found that both the patterns
and magnitudes of changes in productivity, eﬃciency, etc., were broadly similar over the two
periods. As for the entire period 1989–2006, in both subperiods we found that larger credit
unions tended to experience smaller declines in productivity and larger increases in scale
eﬃciency than small credit unions. These results suggest that the Credit Union Membership
Access Act of 1998, which permitted federally-insured credit unions to accept members from
unrelated groups, did not substantially aﬀect long-run patterns of productivity or eﬃciency
change.21
We also investigated whether changes in productivity, eﬃciency, etc., diﬀer systematically
by credit union regulator or insurance agency. Federally-chartered credit unions are regulated
and supervised by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the deposits of
federally-chartered credit unions are insured by the NCUA. State-chartered credit unions,
21 This is perhaps not surprising since the Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998 conﬁrmed a prac-
tice permitted by the National Credit Union Administration that a court ruling had overturned. Estimation
results for the two subperiods are available from the authors upon request.
24however, are subject to state credit union regulations and supervision. Many state-chartered
credit unions carry NCUA insurance and they are required to comply with federal regulations
covering all federally-insured credit unions. However, some state-chartered credit unions
are insured by state insurance systems, and those credit unions are not subject to NCUA
regulation or supervision. We reestimated our models separately for 1) federally-chartered
credit unions; 2) all state-chartered credit unions; and 3) all federally-insured state-chartered
credit unions (the number of non-federally insured state credit unions is too small to obtain
meaningful estimates). Further, we estimated our models separately for each group for each
subperiod 1989–97, 1997-2006, as well as for 1989–2006 as a whole. The results for each
group and each subperiod were again remarkably similar, with no qualitative diﬀerences in
performance between federally-chartered and state-chartered credit unions.22
6 Conclusions
The regulatory and technological environment in which credit unions and other depository
institutions operate has changed dramatically since the mid-1980s. For example, the require-
ment that members of a credit union be linked by a common bond has been eased, as have
limits on business lending by credit unions. The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act subjects credit unions to similar consumer protection,
disclosure and reporting rules as commercial banks, while legislation pending in Congress
would further ease limits on business lending by credit unions.
Alongside the evolving regulatory environment, advances in information-processing tech-
nology have lowered the cost of obtaining and evaluating information about potential bor-
rowers, and thereby eroded some of the advantages of small scale and a common membership
bond in serving consumers and small business customers. As the regulatory and technological
environment have evolved, the average size of credit unions, like commercial banks, has in-
creased and the industry has consolidated through a wave of mergers. Whether credit unions
will remain viable in the long run depends, in part, on how well they continue to adapt to
the changing environment in which they operate. Our research indicates that between 1989
and 2006, credit unions, on average, became less cost-productive, i.e., they incurred greater
22 Results for the various periods and subsamples are available from the authors upon request.
25operating costs in producing given levels of outputs. In addition, we ﬁnd that productivity
declines were largest among the smaller credit unions. Although small credit unions tended
to become more cost eﬃcient, adverse movement in the location and shape of the cost fron-
tier at the left end of the size distribution resulted in signiﬁcant declines in cost-productivity
among small credit unions. Our results are thus consistent with the view that recent changes
in regulation and technology have tended to favor larger depository institutions over their
smaller competitors. They are also consistent with ﬁndings for commercial banks.
Methodologically, this paper provides innovation on several fronts. First, we adapted the
hyperbolic unconditional quantile estimator of Wheelock and Wilson (2008) to the estimation
of cost eﬃciency where input prices and some outputs are ﬁxed, but other outputs and cost
are variable. Second, we derived the corresponding cost analog of the Malmquist productivity
index, which we decomposed to allocate changes in cost-productivity to changes in cost
eﬃciency, technology, and scale eﬃciency. Further, we decomposed a residual term to gain
insights about the sources of changes in scale eﬃciency. Finally, we developed an estimator
of our new distance function, from which we derived estimators of our new Malmquist index
and components. These techniques could be used in a variety of settings to examine changes
in the performance of ﬁnancial institutions and other types of ﬁrms.
A Appendix: Nonparametric Estimation Strategy
In order to estimate γ(w′
ixi,yi | V(Cα(wi,Pt))) corresponding to ﬁrm i, ﬁrst use the Daouia
and Simar (2007) estimator to obtain an estimate   γi =   γα(w′
ixi,yi | C(wi | Pt)) for ﬁrm
i as described above in Section 3.3. Next, for ﬁrms j = 1, ..., n, j ̸= i, use the same
approach to compute estimates   γj =   γα(w′
ixj,yj | C(wi | Pt) (note that here, the price
vector wi faced by ﬁrm i is used). Then project observations onto the estimated order-
α cost frontier by computing (  γ
−1
j w′
ixj,  γjy1j,y2j) for each j = 1, ..., n to form a set




j=1. By construction, the points in Ai,n form an estimate of
the frontier C∂
α(wi,Pt) deﬁned by (3.20). Given the convergence of   γα(w′
ixi,yi | C(wi | Pt)),
we can reasonably conjecture that Ai,n converges pointwise to the true frontier C∂
α(wi,Pt).
Also by construction, the conical hull of this estimate is V(Ai,n). Distance to V(Cα(wi,Pt))
is thus estimated by distance to V(Ai,n), which can be computed to an arbitrary degree using
the bisection method along the lines of Wheelock and Wilson (2008).
26The DEA estimator of the Shephard (1970) input distance function (e.g., see Simar
and Wilson, 2000) can be used to assess convergence of the bisection method. Denote









]′. Then for an arbitrary point (zx,zy) ∈ R+1×R+q, the constant returns
to scale version of the ? input distance function estimator   θ(zx,zy | V(Ai,n)) can be computed
as
  θ(zx,zy | V(Ai,n)) = min
θ,ω1, ..., n







ωj ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1, ..., n}. (A.1)
The complete algorithm for computing an estimate   γ(w′
ixi,yi | V(Cα(wi,Pt))) of
γ(w′
ixi,yi | V(Cα(wi,Pt))) appears below.
Algorithm #1
[1] Set γa = 1, γb = 1.
[2] Set zx = γ−1
a w′






[3] Compute   θ(zx,zy | Ai,n); if   θ(zx,zy | Ai,n) ≥ 1 then set γa = 2 × γa.
[4] Repeat steps [2]–[3] until   θ(zx,zy | Ai,n) < 1.
[5] Set zx = γ
−1
b w′






[6] Compute   θ(zx,zy | Ai,n); if   θ(zx,zy | Ai,n) < 1 then set γb = 0.5 × γb.
[7] Repeat steps [5]–[6] until   θ(zx,zy | Ai,n) >= 1.







]′, and compute   θ(zx,zy | Ai,n).
[9] If   θ(zx,zy | Ai,n) >= 1, then set γa := γc; otherwise, set γb := γc.
[10] If (γb − γa) > ϵ, where ϵ is a suitably small tolerance value, repeat steps [8]–[9].
[11] If   θ(zx,zy | Ai,n) >= 1, then set   γ(w′
ixi,yi | V(Cα(wi,Pt))) = γc; otherwise, set
  γ(w′
ixi,yi | V(Cα(wi,Pt))) = γb.
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31Table 1: Variable Deﬁnitions
LOANS — total loans and leases (CUSA1263).
INVEST — Investments: for 1989, total investments (less derivatives contracts)
(CUSA4577); for 2006, balances due from depository institutions in the US
(CUSA0082) + investments eligible for liquidity (CUSA0851) + membership capital
at corporate credit unions (CUSAB158) + deposits in commercial banks, S&Ls, sav-
ings banks (total amount) (CUSA8632) + paid in capital at corporate credit unions
(CUSAB148) + all other investments in corporate credit unions (CUSA1110) + US
Treasury securities—book value (excluding trading accounts) (CUSA0400) + US Gov-
ernment agency and corporation obligations—book value (excluding trading accounts)
(CUSA0600) + mutual funds (CUSA8628) + shares, deposits, and certiﬁcates in other
credit unions, total amount (CUSA1116).
PRSAV — Savings pricing: [dividends on shares (CUSA4278) + interest on deposits
(CUSA4279)] / total shares and deposits (CUSA2197).
PRLOAN — Loan pricing: interest and fee income on loans, total (CUSA(4010) / amount
of total loans and leases (CUSA1263).
CAP — Financial capital: total shares and deposits (CUSA2196).
LAB — Labor: number of full-time credit union employees (CUSA6047) + (1/2 times)
number of part-time credit union employees (CUSA6048).
WCAP — Price of ﬁnancial capital: capital expenses, i.e. gross occupancy ex-
pense (CUSA4210) + oﬃce operations expense (CUSA4209) + advertising ex-
pense (CUSA4143) + travel and conference expense (CUSA4207) + loan ex-
penses (CUSA4152) + operating expenses fees, professional and outside services
(CUSA4211) + other operating expenses (CUSA4240) + miscellaneous operating ex-
penses (CUSA4526), divided CAP
WLAB — Price of labor: labor expenses, i.e. oﬃcers and employee compensation
(CUSA4137), divided by LAB.
COST — Variable cost: capital expenses + labor expenses, i.e., (WCAP×CAP)+(WLAB×
LAB).
32Table 2: Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Cost Function Speciﬁcation
Min Quartile 1 Median Mean Quartile 3 Max
1989
LOANS 19.69 2196.0 5697.0 2.151E+04 1.665E+04 4.161E+06
INVEST 2.813 529.5 1868.0 9523.0 6554.0 1.733E+06
PRSAV 1.200E-05 0.05645 0.06204 0.06186 0.06779 0.1797
PRLOAN 0.01058 0.1060 0.1131 0.1144 0.1213 0.3319
CAP 78.76 2674.0 7489.0 2.964E+04 2.319E+04 4.630E+06
LAB 0.5000 2.000 4.000 14.30 11.50 2160.0
WCAP 0.0003270 0.01106 0.01589 0.01677 0.02136 0.1081
WLAB 0.2599 23.91 30.24 30.26 36.47 720.1
COST 2.813 87.19 243.3 949.6 761.5 1.411E+05
2006
LOANS 1.899 2761.0 8509.0 6.237E+04 3.166E+04 1.954E+07
INVEST 7.597 1206.0 3965.0 2.081E+04 1.263E+04 4.653E+06
PRSAV 0.0003210 0.01518 0.02012 0.02045 0.02502 0.1190
PRLOAN 0.02128 0.06192 0.06775 0.07098 0.07576 0.5000
CAP 57.92 3955.0 1.224E+04 7.582E+04 4.256E+04 1.966E+07
LAB 0.5000 2.500 6.500 29.69 22.00 5282.0
WCAP 0.001388 0.01552 0.02148 0.02245 0.02780 0.1097
WLAB 0.4368 32.83 40.64 40.85 48.85 148.6
COST 2.849 170.0 547.0 2887.0 1962.0 6.744E+05
NOTE: COST, LOANS, and INVEST are measured in thousands of year-2000 dollars.
PRSAV. PRLOAN, and WCAP are dimensionless quantities; WLAB is measured in thou-
sands of year-2000 dollars per full-time equivalent employee.
33Table 3: Mean Estimates of Changes in Cost Productivity M
t1,t2
i (α) by Size Quintile (α =
0.95)
2006
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Q1 0.6969∗∗∗ 0.7311∗∗∗ 0.7546∗∗∗ 0.8420∗∗∗ 0.7961∗∗∗
(1119) (279) (39) (5) (1)
Q2 0.7184∗∗∗ 0.7352∗∗∗ 0.7909∗∗∗ 0.8826∗∗∗ 0.6639∗∗∗
(300) (785) (320) (38) (2)
1989 Q3 0.7373∗∗∗ 0.7240∗∗∗ 0.7761∗∗∗ 0.8611∗∗∗ 0.9459∗∗∗
(24) (367) (756) (278) (18)
Q4 — 0.7039∗∗∗ 0.7411∗∗∗ 0.8179∗∗∗ 0.9226∗∗∗
(0) (14) (323) (914) (193)
Q5 — — 0.6942∗∗∗ 0.7973∗∗∗ 0.9176∗∗∗
(0) (0) (5) (209) (1230)
NOTE: Each cell contains two entries; the top entry gives the mean, and the bottom entry
gives the number of observations. One, two, or three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at 90,
95, or 99-percent, respectively.
34Table 4: Mean Estimates of Changes in Cost Eﬃciency E
t1,t2
i (α) by Size Quintile (α = 0.95)
2006
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Q1 1.0761∗∗∗ 0.9762∗ 0.9523∗ 1.2037∗∗∗ 1.4318∗∗∗
(1119) (279) (39) (5) (1)
Q2 1.1218∗∗∗ 1.0793∗∗∗ 1.0776∗∗∗ 1.1472∗∗∗ 1.2275∗∗∗
(300) (785) (320) (38) (2)
1989 Q3 1.1835∗∗∗ 1.0853∗∗∗ 1.0784∗∗∗ 1.1117∗∗∗ 1.1689∗∗∗
(24) (367) (756) (278) (18)
Q4 — 1.1644∗∗∗ 1.0730∗∗∗ 1.0947∗∗∗ 1.1282∗∗∗
(0) (14) (323) (914) (193)
Q5 — — 1.0526 1.0426∗∗ 0.9474∗∗
(0) (0) (5) (209) (1230)
NOTE: Each cell contains two entries; the top entry gives the mean, and the bottom entry
gives the number of observations. One, two, or three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at 90,
95, or 99-percent, respectively.
35Table 5: Mean Estimates of Change in Technology T
t1,t2
i (α) by Size Quintile (α = 0.95)
2006
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Q1 0.7625∗∗ 0.8646 0.9662 1.0210 1.9231∗∗∗
(1119) (279) (39) (5) (1)
Q2 0.7722∗∗ 0.7369 0.8385 0.9592 1.0374
(300) (785) (320) (38) (2)
1989 Q3 0.6904∗∗∗ 0.7311 0.8960 1.0159 1.8575
(24) (367) (756) (278) (18)
Q4 — 0.6850∗ 0.7382∗ 0.8455 1.3347
(0) (14) (323) (914) (193)
Q5 — — 0.3939∗∗ 0.6407∗ 1.1613
(0) (0) (5) (209) (1230)
NOTE: Each cell contains two entries; the top entry gives the mean, and the bottom entry
gives the number of observations. One, two, or three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at 90,
95, or 99-percent, respectively.
36Table 6: Mean Estimates of Changes in Scale Eﬃciency S
t1,t2
i (α) by Size Quintile (α = 0.95)
2006
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Q1 0.7917∗∗∗ 0.8840∗∗∗ 0.9143∗ 0.8484∗∗∗ 1.1090∗∗
(1119) (279) (39) (5) (1)
Q2 0.7856∗∗∗ 0.8213∗∗∗ 0.8531∗∗∗ 0.8496∗∗∗ 0.7127∗∗∗
(300) (785) (320) (38) (2)
1989 Q3 0.7914∗∗∗ 0.8388∗∗∗ 0.8589∗∗∗ 0.8760∗∗∗ 0.8461∗∗∗
(24) (367) (756) (278) (18)
Q4 — 0.8375∗∗∗ 0.8751∗∗∗ 0.8791∗∗∗ 0.8940∗
(0) (14) (323) (914) (193)
Q5 — — 0.9801 0.9496 1.0818
(0) (0) (5) (209) (1230)
NOTE: Each cell contains two entries; the top entry gives the mean, and the bottom entry
gives the number of observations. One, two, or three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at 90,
95, or 99-percent, respectively.
37Table 7: Mean Estimates of U
t1,t2
i (α) by Size Quintile (α = 0.95)
2006
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Q1 0.9669 0.9716 0.8903∗∗ 0.8773∗∗∗ 0.8903∗∗
(1119) (279) (39) (5) (1)
Q2 1.0443 1.0984 1.0820 1.0266 1.1850
(300) (785) (320) (38) (2)
1989 Q3 1.0891 1.0743 1.0437 1.0137 1.0401∗
(24) (367) (756) (278) (18)
Q4 — 1.1354 1.1835∗ 1.2851∗∗ 1.3680∗∗∗
(0) (14) (323) (914) (193)
Q5 — — 1.7649∗∗ 1.7834∗∗∗ 2.4619∗∗∗
(0) (0) (5) (209) (1230)
NOTE: Each cell contains two entries; the top entry gives the mean, and the bottom entry
gives the number of observations. One, two, or three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at 90,
95, or 99-percent, respectively.
38Table 8: Mean Estimates of V
t1,t2
i (α) by Size Quintile (α = 0.95)
2006
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Q1 1.1094∗∗∗ 1.0086 1.0074 0.9205 0.2928∗∗∗
(1119) (279) (39) (5) (1)
Q2 1.0109 1.0247 0.9482 0.9197∗∗∗ 0.6173∗∗∗
(300) (785) (320) (38) (2)
1989 Q3 1.0469∗ 1.0124 0.8961∗∗∗ 0.8587∗∗∗ 0.4951∗∗∗
(24) (367) (756) (278) (18)
Q4 — 0.9280 0.9034∗∗∗ 0.7821∗∗∗ 0.5010∗∗∗
(0) (14) (323) (914) (193)
Q5 — — 0.9678 0.7048∗∗∗ 0.3132∗∗∗
(0) (0) (5) (209) (1230)
NOTE: Each cell contains two entries; the top entry gives the mean, and the bottom entry
gives the number of observations. One, two, or three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at 90,
95, or 99-percent, respectively.
39Figure 1: Alternative Measures of Cost Eﬃciency
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